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1 Introduction
The Wenchuan earthquake of 12 May 2008 in
Sichuan, China, claimed 69,227 lives and left
17,932 people missing. More than 374,000 people
were injured. Nearly 90 counties, over 900 towns
and more than 9,000 communities suffered
severe damage in terms of assets, land, jobs,
livelihoods, public facilities, infrastructure, and
human lives. Over 13 mn people lost their
homes. About 1.15 mn farmers lost their land,
and 372,000 urban residents lost their jobs.
These staggeringly large numbers make the
Wenchuan earthquake the largest natural
disaster in the PRC’s 60-year history and
resulted in the creation of the largest post-
disaster social protection schemes in China.
There are a number of studies examining social
protection in the context of disasters, and there
has been debates about its importance (Subbarao
2005; Del Ninno 2008), as well as suggestions for
programme design and lessons regarding
particular social protection polices (Lustig 2000).
What is missing in this body of research,
however, are studies of the effects of disasters on
the social protection system itself.
Social protection structures suffer a double blow
in a disaster. First, there is the direct damage to
resources, in particular personnel and service
delivering capacities, and second there is the
sudden wave of demand for new forms of social
protections from the affected population. This
double blow to the social protection institutions
often results in an incapacity of existing social
protection systems to respond to the needs of the
affected population. The problem of a lack of
institutional capacity in social protection systems
leads us to explore this aspect of the effect of
disasters through examining three aspects:
organisational disaster preparedness,
institutional robustness and operational
resilience.
In a disaster, government agencies are often the
lifeline for communities and the last resort for
most vulnerable people. Thus, the failure of
government institutions causes the population
additional distress and suffering. Disasters
mercilessly expose institutional vulnerabilities.
For example, after Hurricane Katrina and other
Mexican Gulf region disasters, many US
government agencies were made aware that
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relying on a single form of communication leaves
the government itself vulnerable to breakdowns
(Rutzick 2007).
When organisations experience disaster impacts,
‘cracks’ may appear in service delivery systems
(Tausig 1987). Different types of cracks can be
identified in organisations’ service networks
depending on the nature of the organisational
structure, the degree of impact, and the level of
preparedness (Gillespie and Murty 1994).
Identifying and classifying the underlying
weaknesses revealed by those cracks are thus
essential for resuming normal functioning
(Perrow 1994). Equally, identifying points of
special resilience can help determine the best
way to prepare these institutions for catastrophe.
In this article, we examine the social protection
system in the aftermath of the Wenchuan
earthquake from the perspectives of institutional
vulnerability and resilience. Based on household
surveys conducted two months after the
earthquake, and surveys of officials six to eight
months after the earthquake, the article
examines both the social protection system itself
(system design and local government agencies
and officials) and the recipients of the social
protection (people affected by the earthquake).
1.1 Data sources
This article is based on data collected by our
field teams in the affected areas (mostly
Mianyang county). The main collecting
instruments were: a household survey, a survey of
officials and qualitative data collected during a
number of field visits. Document reviews of
government instruments were carried out both
in Sichuan and back in Beijing.
The household survey was conducted between
20 June and 10 July 2008 in Mianyang, the
hardest-hit city in the Wenchuan earthquake. By
this time, all people in Mianyang city had been
evacuated from their homes and had been
settled in temporary camps. We randomly
selected five camps. Then, from every two tents,
we sampled one household to interview. Where a
tent housed several households, we chose the one
where the household head was present. The total
number of households interviewed was 2,003,
and we obtained information for each member,
giving a total individual sample size of 7,407.
A survey of officials was also carried out.
Mianyang city government decided to train its
officials in all levels of governments and all
agencies in order to build capacity in managing
recovery and redevelopment policies. Around
2,060 officials were trained in the City Public
Administrative College from 6 December 2008 to
26 February 2009. The training covered all those
with the administrative ranking of township
head or above in Mianyang city. We used this
opportunity to distribute the questionnaire to
each official, receiving 1,241 responses.
Moreover, we undertook surveys and interviews
five days after the earthquake, in the quake
areas, and were also involved in planning policy
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Table 1 Damage to the social protection system resulting from the Wenchuan earthquake (Mianyang city)
Damages due to the Wenchuan earthquake (%)
Hardware Office buildings 74.2
Office furniture 53.0
Archived files and data 15.6
Official stamps and documents 7.1
Vehicles and equipment 18.4
Building damage resulting in very poor physical working conditions 46.4
Personnel New staff not up to the task 6.6
System personnel injured 8.0
Family members injured 13.2
Family members died or missing 6.7
research for the National Disaster Reduction
Commission during and after the earthquake.
Key policy documents, especially those related to
social protection after the Wenchuan
earthquake, are discussed.
The survey data was tabulated and analysed
using standard statistical packages. The
interviews were fully transcribed and analysed
using both quantitative and qualitative methods.
All tables in this article were produced using
those datasets.
2 Impact of the disaster of the social protection
system
2.1 The SP system suffered extensive damage
Beichuan, the county hardest hit by the
earthquake, suffered grave loss of life and
government capacity. Of the 3,441 government
personnel, 568 died and 172 were severely
disabled in the earthquake, giving a total
casualty rate of 21.5 per cent. In addition, of the
surviving cadres, 36.2 per cent had close family
members die in the earthquake.
In Mianyang city, where the survey of officials
was carried out, capacity was relatively less
damaged than Beichuan. Of the cadres surveyed,
8 per cent suffered injures; 13.2 per cent of their
family members were injured and 6.7 per cent
had family members who had died or were
declared missing. The loss of personnel and
facilities, plus the inevitable organisational
disruption of the disaster presented a great
challenge to the functioning of the social
protection system in the period immediately
after the disaster. Another challenge to be faced
were the bad working conditions most officials
had to negotiate during the emergency, which in
turn greatly increased the physical strain on the
officials. The various forms of damage suffered
by the social protection institutions as the result
of the earthquake are shown in Table 1.
2.2 Most affected people received social protection
promptly
Overall, the response to the earthquake was
effective, judging by the opinion of the people
affected. The mobilisation of resources was
speedy and, despite logistical difficulties caused
by the terrain, emergency supplies reached the
affected populations fairly quickly. Overall, the
early relief effort was more than sufficient to
avoid a ‘secondary catastrophe’ and undue
hardship on the survivors. Using our data, we
analysed the type of assistance the affected
population received (Table 2).
Our findings show considerable variation in the
kind and amount of help received. During the
rescue and evacuation period, relatives, friends
and the army provided the most help, a common
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Table 2 Social protection provision received two months after the earthquake
Type of assistance Received Provider (%)
(%)
Relatives or Local Government Volunteers Army NGOs
friends officials agencies
Rescue and evacuation 34.0 9.7 4.0 6.6 8.1 19.0 3.3 
Food and water 92.7 5.0 19.0 61.1 17.9 5.3 6.8 
Other necessities 80.9 4.7 16.0 52.0 16.4 3.8 7.3 
Medical services/medicines 81.2 1.3 15.2 53.8 14.4 3.9 8.1 
Cash 70.4 3.4 7.3 45.6 3.8 0.3 2.3 
Shelter 32.1 7.1 5.0 17.6 2.2 1.4 1.1 
Building tents/shelters 57.5 5.6 6.7 33.0 6.2 8.8 4.0 
Childcare/tutoring 13.9 0.4 0.3 2.6 8.6 0.6 2.5 
Counselling 27.3 6.9 3.2 3.9 16.0 0.7 0.9 
Books 16.9 0.0 1.8 4.9 8.8 0.3 1.7 
Other assistance 6.6 1.0 1.3 1.2 2.9 0.4 0.7 
pattern in early disaster response. Government
agencies were the main providers of food, water,
living necessities, medical services, medicines
and shelter. Volunteers were expected to play an
important role in social protection provision,
especially in providing food, water, living
necessities, medical services, medicine,
counselling, books, childcare and tutoring, yet
local NGOs (which include organisations
engaged in advocacy on environmental matters,
child protection and other social causes) are still
perceived to have played a relatively minor role
in disaster assistance.
The household surveys conducted two months
after the earthquake in the temporary shelters
indicated that the social protection outcomes of
the survivors were generally good, given the
scale of the disaster. Some 99 per cent said they
had enough food to eat, most of them had meat
in their meals, and nearly 70 per cent of the
shelters had electricity; 92.9 per cent of the
affected had access to safe drinking water;
86.2 per cent of the surveyed people said they
were very satisfied or satisfied with their current
living conditions. Table 3 presents these
findings.
3 Why the system worked despite extensive
damage: elements of resilience
3.1 Solid macro-level institutions and planning is
crucial in post-disaster social protection at local level
China’s pre-disaster emergency social protection
system, as established in the relevant legal
instruments, is based around a centralised
coordinating body for social protection in
disasters. The Ministry of Civil Affairs is
responsible for formulating national disaster
response polices, strategies and programmes; for
coordinating with central government
departments; and for providing guidance to local
governments on disaster mitigation and relief
activities. However, most of the line
responsibilities lie with local authorities and
provincial governments.
Shortly before the earthquake, on 5 August 2007,
China’s State Council had formally issued the
11th National Integrated Disaster Response Five
Year Plan. The goal was to establish a unified
management structure that would coordinate all
levels of government during the rescue stage of
an emergency. It also paid attention to
strengthening the network for central and local
material reserves for disaster assistance and the
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Table 3 Survivors’ living conditions two months after the earthquake
Living conditions (%)
Enough food Yes 99.0
No 1.0
Meat available Daily 23.8
4–5 times per week 5.5
2–3 times per week 22.8
Once a week 30.8
Less than once a week or none 17.1
Electricity Yes 68.9
No 31.1
Safe drinking water Safe 92.9
Not safe 4.6
Unknown 2.5
Satisfaction with current conditions Very satisfied 11.1
Satisfied 75.1
Not very satisfied 11.6
Very unsatisfied 2.1
production of equipment for disaster mitigation
and assistance, and to improving mechanisms to
mobilise the local population and the support of
other unaffected regions. Most notably, for the
first time, the plan made mention of the Red
Cross non-governmental and grassroots
organisations, and formally acknowledged that
these non-government actors should have
responsibility for disaster prevention, early post-
disaster emergency rescue, disaster relief
donations, medical aid, epidemic prevention,
rehabilitation and reconstruction, and post-
disaster psychosocial support.
Following the earthquake, the state council
passed a number of measures detailing courses
of action for relief and early reconstruction (see
Appendix) that provided the macrostructure of
the reconstruction of the social protection system
and its expansion as a mechanism to help the
wider reconstruction of the affected region.
Especially successful were the policies passed in
late May 2008 that included provision of a
stipend of 300 yuan and 0.5 kg of grain per
month for each person in the affected area, an
emergency stipend that was to last three months.
Soon after, a policy was issued to target the
assistance and provide continuing relief to those
eligible (as opposed to the universal coverage of
the original stipend) at a reduced level of 200
yuan per month for the next three months.
These stipends were simple to administer, easy
for recipients to understand, and provided
immediate relief to the affected. (A list of key
policies issued after the Wenchuan earthquake is
provided in the Appendix.)
3.2 Model resilience in the social protection system
Besides the damage to its capabilities, the
sudden increase in demand put great pressure on
the social protection system. These combined
pressures forced institutions to reorganise and
forced officials to make exceptional efforts to
ensure the delivery of social protection to needy
people. The strategies used shed some light on
the characteristics of institutional resilience in a
disaster.
Officials at all levels performed well during the
emergency. During the critical first month,
surviving personnel had to take on not only a
massively increased workload, but a great variety
of emergency tasks for which they were not
formally trained or experienced. Tasks such as
collecting and reporting statistics of deaths,
injuries and damages (the continuous demand
for information, and the pressure this put on
personnel was a common theme in the
interviews), rescuing and transferring the
injured, evacuating and settling the survivors,
building and managing temporary shelters,
helping sanitation and epidemic control and
clearing of dead bodies and ruins. Table 4
summarises the ways in which local authorities
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Table 4 Coping with the sudden increase in demand for social protection
(%)
Increased workload 64.1
Increased responsibilities 67.8
Responsibilities during the first month after the disaster
Statistical information collection and reporting 49.8
Rescue and transferring injured 23.1
Evacuation and temporary settlement of the survivors 51.6
Relief materials and fund allocation and management 46.5
Building temporary shelters 22.4
Managing temporary shelters 13.3
Clearing of dead bodies and ruins 6.4
Sanitation and epidemic control 18.5
Increased working hours (in extra hours)
Before quake 8.2
One month after 13.3
Current 9.3
Changed job or promoted to new positions 16.7
responded to the new demands, and the
obligations they undertook.
This flexibility of task management points to one
significant factor. Operational resilience often
lies in the ability of actors to take on unfamiliar
tasks and improvise ways to reuse surviving
resources. In the interviews, a common theme
was the value of modelling. Familiarity with the
overall mechanisms of social protection
administration, in particular the new protocols
for identifying needs and distributing assistance
in orderly ways were critical for officials dealing
with unexpected demands and new
responsibilities, such as allocating building
materials for temporary shelter. This can be
called ‘model resilience’, in which broad, general
practices can be applied to changing situations.
3.3 Surge and burnout: overloading the social
protection system
While the social protection system managed to
cope with the challenges of the disaster fairly
well, it did so at the cost of straining its
capabilities to the maximum. This overstraining
means that the social protection system is
borrowing from the future to deal with the
present. Success in relief may come at a price
that will be felt during reconstruction.
The main response to the extreme stress that
the disaster put on the system was an increase in
the usage of existing resources to the maximum,
in particular human resources. This ‘surge’ of
effort was not sustainable, and created a
significant ‘burnout’ problem with personnel.
Table 5 summarises the pressure on local
officials and the impact on their mental and
physical health. Using the Center for
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CESD)
(data collected by our team during the cadre
interviews), the average score of the officials was
12.9 six months after the earthquake. At this
stage, 20.1 per cent of them had a score over 20,
which indicates severe depression and 12.1 per
cent had scores between 16 and 19, indicating
moderate depression. On average, the officials
each reported 1.9 health symptoms, an indicator
of general stress on their health.
There was a significant change in self-reported
health status. Those who reported themselves in
excellent health dropped from 28.4 per cent to
8.9 per cent, and those in very good health also
decreased from 36.8 per cent before the
earthquake to 25.7 per cent after it. Those who
reported poor and fair health status increased
significantly, from 5.3 to 21.6 per cent. Over 30
per cent said their health problems were severe,
although more than half did not seek healthcare,
with the main reason being lack of time to go to
hospital. The pressure also resulted in increased
consumption of alcohol and tobacco: before the
disaster, 78.8 per cent were daily smokers, but
this percentage had increased to 87 per cent six
months after the quake. Similar results on
alcohol use have been reported, although we do
not yet have hard data.
The burnout problem can leave the system
vulnerable after the initial relief stage is over. This
can affect the critical early reconstruction effort.
The exact shape of the ‘overload’ curve varies by
locale. In Mianyang, it seems there was a trough of
capability around six months after the disaster
struck. This is also around the time when relief
becomes long-term reconstruction and restoration,
and social protection must shift emphasis to long-
term needs rather than the acute demands of the
disaster. The loss of capability, therefore, probably
affects this transition.
4 Public demands for assistance and their effect
on official response: equality and the focus on
equal treatment
A dominant theme found in the interviews with
both the affected people and the officials is an
overarching concern with fairness of treatment. This
concern with fairness was expressed with a very
strong emphasis on equality, understood as exact
sameness of treatment by social protection
institutions.
It will be fine if no one receives assistance, but if
someone else has it, I must have it.
(Quote from an interview with an individual
survivor in July 2008)
If you cannot provide enough relief to everyone, it is
better not to allocate anything to my village. I cannot
decide who should be eligible, and if I cannot
distribute the relief equally, I am afraid it will cause
social unrest.
(Quote from an interview with a village
official in August 2008)
Table 6 presents the perception of the nature of
the allocation of disaster assistance from the
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Table 5 Pressure on the local officials and impact on health
Mental health
CESD (%)
<16 67.9
16–19 12.1
≥20 20.1
Average score 12.9
Symptoms (%)
Chest pain 14.3
Stomach pain 9.9
Diarrhoea 11.2
Headache 36.6
Serious injury 0.7
Non-serious injury 3.9
Fever 4.9
Cough, sore throat 45.3
Palpitation 44.8
Other 17.2
Total score 1.9
Self-reported health status (%) Before After
Excellent 28.4 8.9
Very good 36.8 25.7
Good 29.5 43.9
Fair 3.9 17.2
Poor 1.4 4.4
Self-assessment of current health problems (%)
Very serious 1.7
Relative serious 10.1
Serious 27.7
Not serious 42.5
Hard to say 17.9
Treatment when sick (%)
Hospitalised 4.1
Outpatient clinic treated 21.2
Family/friend treated 3.7
Bought drugs 56.3
Not treated 14.8
Reason for not seeking treatment (%)
Not serious 31.2
Financial difficulties 6.7
No time 43.9
Inconvenient transport 0.7
Long waiting line in the hospitals 3.3
Don’t like hospitals 9.3
Other 4.9
Behaviour health: smoking (%) Before After
Occasionally 21.2 13.0
Daily 78.8 87.0
officials’ and recipients’ perspectives. There was
a marked difference in the way both sides
perceived the allocation of resources. Over 50
per cent of recipients believed that more relief
materials and funds were allocated to the bigger
households; the officials thought they had
allocated the relief materials and fund to the
households which had suffered the biggest losses.
Officials were twice as likely as recipients to say
that they had allocated more assistance to the
poor. Furthermore, recipients believed that those
who were powerful, with connections, and those
who came early got more. Interestingly the
officials believed that it was those who
complained the loudest that had been likely to
receive more, but recipients did not believe this.
These differences in perceptions of allocative
principles (targeted vs. universally equal)
affected how people viewed the fairness of the
disaster assistance. Table 7 presents these
findings.
The overwhelming majority of officials believed
that the distribution of relief, fund allocation
process and the outcomes were fair or relatively
fair. The affected people generally agreed on the
fairness of the allocation, but a significant
minority felt that the system was not fair. Table 7
indicates that both officials and recipients put
great emphasis on equality of treatment by social
protection institutions.
While most of those affected perceived the
process of allocation as basically fair, the
emphasis on identical treatment influenced the
distribution of assistance in potentially
damaging ways. This emphasis on equality
probably derived from the perception that any
deviation would result not from rational criteria
or impartial need assessment. Instead, the
expectation was that unequal assistance would
result from influence peddling. This belief was so
strong that it influenced perceptions of the
fairness of the process of allocation, and in turn,
affected the behaviour of the relief suppliers,
who avoided conflict by attempting to preserve a
sense of fairness-as-equality.
5 Conclusions
5.1 Key elements of resilience in social protection
This article has used the Wenchuan earthquake
as a case for the damage suffered by, and the
resilience of, social protection systems and
providers during disasters. The analysis of the
data is still ongoing, but we have identified
several main areas of interest involving the
resilience, fragility and continued functioning of
social protection structures during disaster
situations.
First, the social protection system itself will also
suffer from damages in disasters. This calls for
extra planning and recovery strategies for the
institutions themselves if they are to restore
enough capacity with sufficient speed. The social
protection system can cope in a short burst, but
it does so by overstraining to provide basic
requirements when most needed.
At a macro-level, the study supports the
importance of an actionable disaster response
plan, quick policy responses and innovative
approaches in both financing and delivery of
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Table 6 Allocation of the relief materials and funds (%)
People Cadres
Each household about the same 25.0 20.0
Bigger households received more 53.0 26.7
Households which suffered greater losses received more 10.4 44.7
Poor received more 1.9 4.1
Rich received more 0.2 0.5
Powerful received more 2.2 0.9
Households with more connections received more 4.5 0.6
Those who complained more got more 0.4 2.1
Those who came early received more 2.5 0.6
social protection. The centralised but layered
nature of the Chinese state creates complex
issues of coordination and unclear chains of
command.
How the structure of the pre-disaster social
protection system influences its resilience in the
event of a disaster is less clear. It seems apparent
from the responses that a wide general
understanding of the functioning of social
protection processes allowed personnel to take on
new tasks and develop new skills as required,
something that seems to have helped create
systemic resilience. These daunting tasks of social
protection after earthquakes can be managed by
reallocating local government staff and officials.
Even severely damaged social protection
institutions restored functionality in a very short
period by intensifying the use of surviving
resources. However, this ‘burst’ overstresses the
local system in the long run, as human resources
become over-exhausted and existing
organisational structures become overextended
and frayed. This can result in an ‘aftershock’ dip
in functionality, or even near-systemic failure,
several months after the initial event.
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Table 7 Equity concerns over disaster assistance. Were the relief materials and funds distributed fairly? (%)
Officials’ view of the process Officials’ view on the outcome Recipients’ view of the outcome
Fair 23.3 17.9 34.5
Relatively fair 73.0 76.5 45.2
Not fair 3.8 5.7 20.3
